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The fans have taken over!
A book such as this would have been almost inconceivable a decade ago, such is its dedication to its subject matter.Without wishing to use the comparison in a derogatory manner, the "Dark Shadows Almanac" isa book which reads almost like a fanzine as opposed to a standard referenceguide.As such, the serious fans will lap it up, even if their lessinitiated counterparts will be left scratching their heads inconfusion.

Composed of a scrapbook-style mix of bite-size pieces oftrivia, rare photographs, cast remembrances and obscure information, theresult is a warm tribute which, much like the show it is inspired by, makesup for its occasional instances of over-ambition with a charming sense ofenthusiasm.

Perhaps the most bizarre aspect of this book is the mannerin which it offers a handy way of discovering how great a fan you reallyare of "Dark Shadows": If you read the text with interest,understanding the feelings of nostalgia and warm remembrance, then you aredoubtless part of the fan community already; if you are occasionally leftpuzzling over elements, then you are well on your way to making thecrossover; and if the whole thing leaves you cold, then perhaps theprospect of further initiation is a dish best not served.

In short,this is a book which will be of great appeal to its intended audience, butprobably to that demographic only.Speaking as a fan of "DarkShadows", I think that the book is a fine tribute for readers likemyself and, looking at the results, can't help wishing that more viewers ofshows were catered for this well.

If you do not have this book yet, get it know!!!
The Dark Shadows Almanac: 30th Anniversarty Tribute is a wonderful book Published and Edited by Dark Shadows star Kathryn Leigh Scott. Many cast and crew members have written chapters in this book. The foreword waswritten by David Selby. This book has 176 pages of wonderful memories thatall Dark Shadows fans need to share. ... Read more

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Education plays a vitally important role in building foundations for social progress. This remarkable collection describes educational models based on the principles of tolerance, equity and justice developed over the past three decades by teachers, parents, activists and students. In a time of crippling cutbacks and educational reforms designed to promote ‘business’ over ‘education,’ this book is critical reading. Contributors from across Canada discuss the initiatives behind their approaches, how they developed curricula and the future of their educational work:

Anti-Homophobia Initiatives, Tim McCaskell and Vanessa Russell

Multicultural and Anti-Racist Education, Ouida M. Wright

Black Education, Maxine Bramble

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Reason is the slave of the passions
I read this book for a graduate seminar on ethics.Hume's Treatise of Human Nature along with his staunch empirical approach to epistemology, has garnered him recognition as a "great skeptic" of the rationalist tradition in philosophy and recognition as the greatest philosopher to write in English.Hume's ethical project is concerned with discovering how people's nature dictates moral behavior and in discovering the moral virtues that society deems useful.Hume separates himself from the classical Greek notion of how an agent acts virtuously when he posits his thesis that people are incapable of using reason to sway their emotions or substantially influence their wills."I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will."((T, 2.3.3).Hume's theory regarding the process that agents use to act is a departure from the classical Greek model in that it relies on passion and is devoid of the idea of using practical reasoning to overcome feelings of fear to accomplish a noble end.For Hume, only a person's passions can choose their ends, and he denies that reason has the ability to evaluate their ends.(T, 3.1.1).Hume's notions on reason vastly contradicts the vast majority of ancient and modern philosophers' beliefs, regarding the amalgamation of human emotion and reason producing the practical reasoning to guide an agent to act.

Hume's anti-rationalist assertion that reason cannot be the major factor producing moral action provides the foundation for his entire ethical theory.In essence, Hume uses a causality argument to explain virtues and vices and what motivates people to make moral choices.Hume argues that what moves people are sentiments of pleasure, such as, pride or love, or pain, such as humility or hatred, as they either observe actions by others or contemplate performing acts of their own."In every case, therefore, we must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility."(T, 3. 3. 1).Hume adopts a subjective view to morality.He argues that one cannot use reason or science to deduce "truths" in ethics.Actions are deemed virtuous by a particular society through judgments of approval or distaste of people's sentiments when observing or contemplating a particular action.With this ethical model, Hume posits the notion that there are only two types of virtues, "natural" and "artificial," and that courage is a natural virtue since it brings the pleasurable sentiment of praise and pride to the one who acts courageously.

Hume leaves very little if any room for reason to either direct the people will, or even work in conjunction with people passions or emotions to form any kind of practical reasoning a person can rely on to guide them on a path to ethical behavior.
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This reproduction was printed from a digital file created at the Library of Congress as part of an extensive scanning effort started with a generous donation from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.The Library is pleased to offer much of its public domain holdings free of charge online and at a modest price in this printed format.Seeing these older volumes from our collections rediscovered by new generations of readers renews our own passion for books and scholarship. ... Read more

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1941: As bombs fall on the city of London, Quentin Collins is reunited with his old friend, Rose. Trapped in an underground station, she claims to have no memory of him. So he tells her how they met. 1906: Music hall star Rosie Fay is the talk of the town. But what connects her to the cases of spontaneous human conbustion plaguing London's ladies of the night? and why is Quentin so interested in the song she sings? ... Read more

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The Introduction, I.-IV. The character of Catiline, V. Virtues of the ancient Romans, VI.-IX. Degeneracy of their posterity, X.-XIII. Catiline's associates and supporters, and the arts by which he collected them, XIV. His crimes and wretchedness, XV. His tuition of his accomplices, and resolution to subvert the government, XVI. His convocation of the conspirators, and their names, XVII. His concern in a former conspiracy, XVIII., XIX. Speech to the conspirators, XX. His promises to them, XXI. His supposed ceremony to unite them, XXII. His designs discovered by Fulvia, XXIII. His alarm on the election of Cicero to the consulship, and his design in engaging women in his cause, XXIV. His accomplice, Sempronia, characterized, XXV. His ambition of the consulship, his plot to assassinate Cicero, and his disappointment in both, XXVI. His mission of Manlius into Etruria, and his second convention of the conspirators, XXVII. His second attempt to kill Cicero; his directions to Manlius well observed, XXVIII. His machinations induce the Senate to confer extraordinary power on the consuls, XXIX. His proceedings are opposed by various precautions, XXX. His effrontery in the Senate, XXXI. He sets out for Etruria, XXXII. His accomplice, Manlius, sends a deputation to Marcius, XXXIII. His representations to various respectable characters, XXXIV. His letter to Catulus, XXXV. His arrival at Manlius's camp; he is declared an enemy by the Senate; his adherents continue faithful and resolute, XXXVI. The discontent and disaffection of the populace in Rome, XXXVII. The old contentions between the patricians and plebeians, XXXVIII. The effect which a victory of Catiline would have produced, XXXIX. The Allobroges are solicited to engage in the conspiracy, XL. They discover it to Cicero, XLI. The incaution of Catiline's accomplices in Gaul and Italy, XLII. The plans of his adherents at Rome, XLIII. The Allobroges succeed in obtaining proofs of the conspirators' guilt, XLIV. The Allobroges and Volturcius are arrested by the contrivance of Cicero, XLV. The principal conspirators at Rome are brought before the Senate, XLVI. The evidence against them, and their consignment to custody, XLVII. The alteration in the minds of the populace, and the suspicions entertained against Crassus, XLVIII. The attempts of Catulus and Piso to criminate Caesar, XLIX. The plans of Lentulus and Cethegus for their rescue, and the deliberations of the Senate, L. The speech of Caesar on the mode of punishing the conspirators, LI. The speech of Cato on the same subject, LII. The condemnation of the prisoners; the causes of Roman greatness, LIII. Parallel between Caesar and Cato, LIV. The execution of the criminals, LV. Catiline's warlike preparations in Etruria, LVI. He is compelled by Metullus and Antonius to hazard an action, LVII. His exhortation to his men, LVIII. His arrangements, and those of his opponents, for the battle, LIX. His bravery, defeat, and death, LX., LXI. ... Read more

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Originally published in 1902.This volume from the Cornell University Library's print collections was scanned on an APT BookScan and converted to JPG 2000 format by Kirtas Technologies.All titles scanned cover to cover and pages may include marks notations and other marginalia present in the original volume. ... Read more

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A Classic Edition of Two Philosophical Masterworks
Hume's Enquiries are more or less a repackaging of the material from Books I and III of his earlier A Treatise of Human Nature.Ever desirous of literary fame and dismayed by the lack of interest others had shown for his prior tome, Hume went back to the drawing board and attempted to present his philosophical system in a way that would be palatable to the reading public.We should feel fortunate that he did so.For, though the significant changes are in style and emphasis rather than substance, these books are a perfect introduction to Hume's thinking.And while the shorter form did require some not insignificant cutting, most of what you find in the earlier book is presented here in a simpler, more accessible manner.That's not to say that there is nothing new here; there is.In particular, he considers some religious subjects (i.e. miracles and immortality) that he was unwilling to broach in the earlier work.

The connecting thread here is an emphasis on grounding philosophical inquiry in an empirical account of human nature, and particularly of the human mind.The first Enquiry is an account of Hume's take on the implications of the classical empiricism he inherited from Locke and Berkeley.For Hume, as for the other classical empiricists, empiricism was primarily a psychological theory about the origin and content of our concepts.(So empiricism, Hume thought, is a crucial element of any plausible account of the human mind.)The central tenet of this theory is that our concepts are furnished by experience, which includes both sensory experience and introspection (i.e., the experience of our own mental states).And the empiricists also agreed about the way we can justify our beliefs.Some beliefs are true (or false) in virtue of the ideas they contained, and we can know their truth (or falsity) simply by thinking about them; other beliefs are true (or false) in virtue of how the external world is, and we can know their truth (or falsity) only by drawing on our experiences of the world.According to Hume, all substantial conclusions about the world fall into this second category.That is, the truth (or falsity) of all substantial claims about the existence and nature of things in the external world can be discovered only by checking those claims against the evidence of our senses.

Here we seem Hume wielding this philosophy of mind in order to adjudicate disputes in metaphysics and epistemology.Do you want to know whether something can be known?Then think about the concepts in which it is expressed.Could we come to know this by thinking about the meaning of our concepts?Could we come to know it by going and looking or doing certain empirical tests?If the answer to both these questions is no, then knowledge of this subject is an impossibility for us.Do you want to know whether some claim of the metaphysicians is true or whether it even makes sense?Consider the concepts they use to express their views.Is there any way you could reduce the content of this concept to some experience?If not, their claims are literally meaningless.

This interpretation of Hume's project downplays his skepticism and emphasizes his professed intentions to provide a positive account of the operation of the human mind that appealed to nothing beyond the evidence of our senses.According to proponents of this interpretation, Hume is most interested in a description of the operation of the human mind.He's describing what human nature allows us to know and what it doesn't allow us to know.Furthermore, he argues that our nature is such that, where it fails to provide us with the resources to acquire the knowledge we might want, it provides us with a natural habit of forming the right conclusions anyway.Even though our nature limits our knowledge of the world, it ensures that we possess the habits of mind needed to make our way in the world.Hume dubs all these habits of mind "custom."

And I think this naturalistic interpretation of Hume's project provides an entry into the views he defends in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.Again, it's possible to interpret Hume's project in moral philosophy as a skeptical one.The fact that he thinks morality is based in human sentiments show that he is, in some sense, a subjectivist about morality.He doesn't think there is any plausible account of our moral thinking as based on reason or empirical inquiry alone.Morality, then, is more a matter of feeling than a matter of thinking, observing, and reasoning. But, importantly, Hume doesn't think this is indicative of some problem with morality, and so he doesn't understand himself to be undermining ordinary morality.His aim is to expose the groundless pretensions of reason in order to make room for a wholly naturalistic account morality; it's not to show that morality doesn't have a firm basis.For he does not think that morality would ideally be based on reason and empirical evidence rather than sentiment.Rather, he thinks there is a sort of philosophical overreaching involved in trying to base morality on reason or empirical evidence as opposed to sentiment.

But what is the relevant sentiment? According to Hume, it is a general sort of benevolence, of concern for others.Our possessing such a feeling does not mean that we'll always set aside our own interest in the interest of others; nor does it mean that we are not largely self-interested.It does, however, mean that we're not wholly self-interested, as we are motivated to do (and not do) certain things even when they do not affect our own interests and desires.But what inspires these sentiments, and how exactly do they translate into moral judgments?Morality, Hume argues, is based on sentiments of approbation and disapprobation that are prompted by a recognition of the connection between human actions, dispositions, etc. and what is in the best interest of oneself and of mankind in general.What we take to be virtues, Hume argues, are those dispositions that lead a person to perform actions tending to promote his own happiness and the happiness of others, whereas vices are dispositions that do the opposite. ... Read more