Product Description
In Vietnam, Gary R. Hess describes and evaluates the main arguments of scholars, participants, and journalists, both revisionist and orthodox in their approach, as they try to answer fundamental questions of the Vietnam War.

• Clearly examines the historiography of the Vietnam War


• Questions whether the Vietnam War was lost due to poor strategy and leadership, or was inherently doomed to failure


• Includes a bibliographic essay which complements the literature discussed in the text

Product Description
How Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger pursued their public vow to end the Vietnam War and win the peace has long been entangled in bitter controversy and obscured by political spin. Recent declassifications of archival documents, on both sides of the former Iron and Bamboo Curtains, have at last made it possible to uncover the truth behind Nixon's and Kissinger's management of the war and to better understand the policies and strategies of the Vietnamese, Soviets, and Chinese.

Drawing from this treasure trove of formerly secret files, Jeffrey Kimball has excerpted more than 140 print documents and taped White House conversations bearing on Nixon-era strategy. Most of these have never before been published and many provide smoking-gun evidence on such long-standing controversies as the "madman theory" and the "decent-interval" option. They reveal that by 1970 Nixon's and Kissinger's madman and détente strategies had fallen far short of frightening the North Vietnamese into making concessions. By 1971, as Kissinger notes in one key document, the administration had decided to withdraw the remaining U.S. combat troops while creating "a healthy interval for South Vietnam's fate to unfold."

The new evidence uncovers a number of behind-the-scenes ploys--such as Nixon's secret nuclear alert of October 1969--and sheds more light on Nixon's goals in Vietnam and his and Kissinger's strategies of Vietnamization, the "China card," and "triangular diplomacy." The excerpted documents also reveal significant new information about the purposes of the LINEBACKER bombings, Nixon's manipulation of the POW issue, and the conduct of the secret negotiations in Paris--as well as other key topics, events, and issues. All of these are effectively framed by Kimball, whose introductions to each document provide insightful historical context.

Building on the ground-breaking arguments of his earlier prize-winning book, Nixon's Vietnam War, Kimball also offers readers a concise narrative of the evolution of Nixon-era strategy and a critical assessment of historical myths about the war. The story that emerges from both the documents and Kimball's contextual narratives directly contradicts the Nixon-Kissinger version of events. In fact, they did not pursue a consistent strategy from beginning to end and did not win a peace with honor.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Nam policy history
At less than 370 pages, THE VIETNAM WAR FILES / UNCOVERING THE SECRET HISTORY OF NIXON-ERA STRATEGY by Jeffrey Kimball is a small book, compared to the size of the ax which it is attempting to grind on how poorly American policy works in those areas of the world where a quick victory is not in the cards.The longer version of the story, told in NIXON'S VIETNAM WAR (1998) by Jeffrey Kimball attempted to cover the years 1953 to 1973.The events of those years were rather awesome in leading up to the final situation, which is covered in depth in this book, described in the Prologue as carrying the analysis onward "from 1969 to 1975" (p. 3) to show how events conformed to expectations in the way Robert McNamara had expected the odds to be about even already in December, 1965, when considering how the war was going to present even tougher choices down the road.

Those who were most interested in how awful Vietnam turned out as a big step on the road to American hyperpower status will not be surprised that Kimball's epilogue to this book begins with insights on `historical myth' and `mythical tale' from those times before declaring that Nixon's and Kissinger's memoirs "were self-serving, incomplete, and obfuscatory, and they took legal and administrative steps that delayed the release of relevant documentary evidence about their policies, strategies, and motives."(p. 297).There was no good reason to tell Americans that power could make us more hyper than we already had been, but Kimball is good at finding the secrets which show how hyper the drive for American power has become.

I like books which make secret policies a major quest in the historical area, and this one laments the fact that not much has been found yet about Cambodia.History is such a dynamic pursuit, with odd quirks popping out from weird angles, that I doubt any adequate explanation of that bit of secret policy will ever be forthcoming.People who thought that Americans needed to fight in Nam so San Francisco would be safe see that argument fail when it is applied to Cambodia, South Vietnam's only neighbor south of Laos, where a peaceful situation prior to 1970 rapidly turned into a victory for enemies of civilization in any form advanced enough to unleash a massive bombing campaign, as a demonstration of hyperpower capabilities when bombs were dropping like the cards in a game of 52 pick up.

This book is most game-like in its use of card terminology for the Nixon strategy, which even carries over to "Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had coincidentally decided that it was time to rejoin the world of nations, play the American card against the Soviet Union, and, especially, use the opportunity to get U.S. forces out of Taiwan."(p. 299).That might seem like a bit much for the Chinese to hope for, but a tape on Nam reveals Nixon saying, "Oh, I don't mean to tell, tell Thieu we're getting out in the fall.But it's moot, because we are without question gonna get out . . ."(p. 168).That was from Oval Office Conversation no. 527-16, Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger, and John Ehrlichman, 9:14-10:12 a.m., June 23, 1971, in which Kissinger said, "Now, our cards, starting now, our cards are going to start falling."(p. 167).Three weeks before, a press conference brought up antiwar sentiment `that American intervention was immoral' (p. 160) and a tape of the following morning, June 2, 1971, reveals that Nixon was "very agitated during the conversation.Pounding his desk at one point, he vowed, . . .He would use his `card' of massive bombing."(p. 161).Since American troops were there, "it is certainly immoral to send Americans abroad and not back them up with American power!"(p. 162).Nixon might be a bit unclear about what actually happened after the French left North Vietnam, but he was worried about allowing "the bloodbath in South Vietnam that they had in North Vietnam where 50,000 of our good Catholic [unclear] of Danang [a city shown on the map facing page 1 along the coast southeast of Quang Tri and Hue in South Vietnam] were murdered, 500,000 were starved to death in slave-labor camps [pounding his desk]."(p. 162).In the next page of the transcript, it is a footnote that describes "Nixon is shouting and pounding his desk, while Kissinger is trying to speak."(p. 163).Like Khrushchev taking off his shoe to pound on a desk at the United Nations, hyperpowers believe in their ability to emphasize what they say when considering options like "We're gonna take out the dikes, we're gonna take out the power plants, we're gonna take out Haiphong, we're gonna level that goddamn country!"(p. 163).

Sometimes it is difficult to make sense of the conversations contained in pages 127-294, from Le Duc Tho's observation "It will take an unlimited time.We don't know when, or whether, it will be done.If it does not work, you will have the choice to remain in Vietnam or leave."(February 21, 1970, p. 129) to "It is a tragic situation.I am deeply troubled by what has happened . . ." (a proposed response on April 3, 1975, p. 294).Nam was unique in being a country in which the United States found itself opposing an established government with a lot of half measures which Nixon didn't want to limit himself to:

KISSINGER:Mr. President, if you had been in office '66, '67--

NIXON:--The war would be over--

KISSINGER:the war would be over, and, and, they'd be fewer casualties--
(p. 162).In '67, even General Westmoreland thought we were winning, but he was never sure the war was over.As far as policy goes, Nam is like an intelligence test that never quits for people looking for vicious evidence of American cruelty.Even Osama knows about Nam.

New evidence
Kimball's Vietnam War Files is a followup book to his award-winning Nixon's Vietnam War (1998).Both books break new ground on the history of the Nixon-Kissinger phase of the Vietnam War inasmuch as they both draw on a treasure trove of declassified documents from both sides of the conflict, clarify controversies about Nixon-Kissinger strategy, and reveal new information about the Nixon administration's handling of the war and about Communist Vietnamese strategy.The Vietnam War Files is briefer than Nixon's Vietnam War, but it includes numerous additional documents that were declassified between 1998 and 2004.Many of these documents consist of Kimball's own transcriptions of conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office about key strategies and decisions.There is new information about Nixon's highly secret nuclear alert of 1969, the Madman Theory, détente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, and many other issues, including the Nixon-Kissinger decent-interval exit strategy.All of the documents in The Vietnam War Files make fascinating reading.More importantly, they demonstrate how solid, smoking-gun evidence (here reproduced in the form of substantial excerpts from paper files and transcribed conversations) can help readers break through the long-standing, politically charged debate about Nixon, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War.This was one of Kimball's purposes in writing the book: to substitute good evidence and sound logic for biased argument.The Vietnam War Files is Kimball's third book about Vietnam.His past writings have also included articles and essays about war and diplomacy.He has also interviewed some of the key policymakers on both sides of the war.

Original thesis!
Much of this book is predicated on the newly released Nixon tapes; thus, it offers many new insights.However, on page 20,the author implies that the first draft lottery was held in 1971.The first draft lottery was held Dec. 1, 1969 and took effect in Jan. 1970. ... Read more

Product Description
In this new edition of his widely acclaimed study, William Duiker has revised and updated his analysis of the Communist movement in Vietnam from its formation in 1930 to the dilemmas facing its leadership in the post-Cold War era. Making use of newly available documentary sources and recent Western scholarship, the author reevaluates Communist revolutionary strategy during the Vietnam War. Based on primary materials in several languages, this respected work is essential for an understanding of Vietnam in the twentieth century. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Great History of Vietnam
Duiker is one of the best, if not the best, writers on modern Vietnamese history.

This book avoids spin and tells the actual events that led from Colonial suffering to revolution and beyond.

Any fan of Duiker should really give this book a read - enthralling.

Also check out: Ho Chi Minh: A Life by Duiker.

The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam
A very well written book with good visual aids to know what is going on.the new items added to the book really enhance the over-all reading experience ... Read more

Product Description
The American experience in the Vietnam War has been the subject of a vast body of scholarly work, yet surprisingly little has been written about how the war is remembered by Vietnamese themselves. The Country of Memory fills this gap in the literature by addressing the subject of history, memory, and commemoration of the Vietnam War in modern day Vietnam.

This pathbreaking volume details the nuances, sources, and contradictions in both official and private memory of the War, providing a provocative assessment of social and cultural change in Vietnam since the 1980s. Inspired by the experiences of Vietnamese veterans, artists, authorities, and ordinary peasants, these essays examine a society undergoing a rapid and traumatic shift in politics and economic structure. Each chapter considers specific aspects of Vietnamese culture and society, such as art history, commemorative rituals and literature, gender, and tourism. The contributors call attention to not only the social milieu in which the work of memory takes place, but also the historical context in which different representations of the past are constructed. ... Read more

Product Description
This book examines states and state capacity in four countries that have experienced rapid economic growth over several decades, China, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam It argues that while modern market forces and transnational corporations exert tremendous pressures, states still matter. The capacity of the East Asian state to adapt and develop new institutions is empirically illustrated as well as theoretically contextualized. ... Read more

Product Description
Harry Truman's administration began searching for an American response to the clash in Indochina between Frech colonialism and Vietminh communism in 1945. Thirty years and five administrations later, Gerald Ford and his aides tried unsuccessfully to solicit additional aid for South Vietnam from a reluctant Congress. For Truman, Ford, and every American leader in between, the dilemma in Vietnam hung ominously over the presidency.

In Shadow on the White House, seven prominent historians examine how the leadership of six presidents and an issue that grew into a difficult and often unpopular war shaped each other. Focusing on the personalities, politics, priorities, and actions of the presidents as they confronted Vietnam, the authors consider the expansion of presidential power in foreign-policy formulation since World War II. In ther analyses, they chronicle the history of executive leadership as it related to Vietnam, assess presidential prerogatives and motives on war and peace issues, and clarify the interconnection between the modern presidency and tha nation's frustrating, tragic, and humiliating failure in Southeast Asia.

Although other histories have been written about the Vietnam experience, this book is the first systematic and comparative survey on presidential leadership as it relates to the war issue. It is organized by presidential administrations, giving a detailed examination of each president's decisions and policies. Based on the most recently opened archival sources, the essays provide a framework on which to hang the kaleidoscopic events of the war.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series. ... Read more

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What went wrong in Vietnam?
Michael Lind casts new light on one of the most contentious episodes in American history in this controversial bestseller.

In this groundgreaking reinterpretation of America's most disatrous and controversial war, Michael Lind demolishes enduring myths and put the Vietnam War in its proper context -- as part of the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Lind reveals the deep cultural divisions within the United States that made the Cold War consensus so fragile and explains how and why American public support for the war in Indochina declined. Even more stunning is his provacative argument that the United States failed in Vietnam because the military establishment did not adapt to the demands of what before 1968 had been largely a guerrilla war.

In an era when the United States often finds itself embroiled in prolonged and difficult conflicts in places like Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq, Lind offers a sobering cautionary tale to Ameicans of all political viewpoints.Amazon.com Review
This original and provocative book is certain to raiseemotions. Its justification of America's war in Southeast Asiadirectly contradicts other recent studies, such as FredrikLogevall's ChoosingWar and RobertS. McNamara's Argument WithoutEnd. MichaelLind, Washington Editor for Harper's magazine, examines theAmerican military response to North Vietnamese aggression; Americancredibility during the cold war; domestic politics; and constitutionalaspects of the conflict. He places the war's center of gravity inAmerican public opinion rather than in the population of South Vietnamor the North Vietnamese army. In doing so, he can be blunt, as when heclaims that members of the Western left who made excuses for the NorthVietnamese land-reform terror were "apologists for state-sponsoredgenocide." One of his conclusions is that if the United States is tocontinue to be the dominant world power, "then American soldiers mustlearn to swim in quagmires." Viewing America's Southeast Asianadventure in the context of the cold war, Lind regards it not as acrime, betrayal, or tragic error, but as an unavoidableconfrontation. Whether you agree with his arguments, Vietnam: TheNecessary War intelligently, often vehemently, challengespreconceptions that surround the most controversial military conflictin American history. --John Stevenson ... Read more

Customer Reviews (52)

Through Your Own Lens
Interesting book.If you think that there was a Soviet-run hegemonic communist world wide movement, you will like the book.If you think this is a huge over simplification, you will find the book absurd.He does seem to gloss over any contradictory information that may weaken his thesis, but it will definitely make you think.

Different Premise - Disagreeable Assumptions
Initially I liked this book because it does have some different viewpoints from the standard anti-American liberal take on the Vietnam War.But I really disagree with the premise that the war had to be fought to maintain American prestige. If we had never gone to Vietnam in the first place there would have been no need to save face.It is simple as that.

I also disagree with the premise that we could not have won the war.I am no expert, but I think we lost the Vietnam war because of the manner in which the liberal idiot LBJ decided to fight the war.I also think that when you go to war for the wrong reasons, which LBJ and JFK both did, you will have a much harder time winning because your strategy will be determined by the wrong reasons and as a leader you will make the wrong decisions.

I understand LBJ did not want to bring China into the war like what happened in the Korean War.But that did not mean that he had to fight the war the way he did.

We should have gone to WIN and hand a crushing defeat to the communists or not at all.

They actually published this garbage
This man is such an idiot!!! I am a college student taking a Vietnam Era class and I have read many books and documents on the different aspects of the Vietnam War most of which are excellent but this by far is absolute junk.The only reason I finished the book was because I had a research paper to do.This book make conjectures that are so far fetched that you can not even argue them because you are too busy scratching you head. A big one that stands out is when he says that the domino theory is not real but then gives you his own version of the domino theory and calls it the "Bandwagon Theory."It is astonishing that this book is still printed. I would not even waste your money buying it because you will be scratching you head saying, "They actually published this garbage."

Pushing the Envelope
Lind is a provocative, engaging, and also infuriating writer.In this book on the American experience in Vietnam, he offers up a new take strategy and the balance of power in the Cold War that is extremely different. The United States had to fight in Vietnam and lose (although winning would have been preferable) to prove that its word had meaning and that the allies could count on their American friends. "It was necessary for the United States to escalate the war in the mid-1960s in order to defend the credibility of the United States as a superpower, but it was necessary for United States to forfeit the war after 1968, in order to preserve the American domestic political consensus in favor of the Cold War on other fronts. Indochina was worth a war but only a limited war--and not the limited war that the United States actually fought" (p. xv).

At times the book reads like it was designed for domestic political consumption and winning points on one of the cable talk shows that are broadcast from various parts of the Washington, D.C. area. It is far more sophisticated than what anyone will find on those shows, though.

Lind basically calls it like he sees it and manages to rankle almost anyone who has a stake in American public life: Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, the religious, the military, the antiwar movement and pacifists, the American intellectual community, and the civil rights movement to name just a few. Those few groups that do not get offended in some form from this book are probably not all that important in the first place. In the process, he punctures many myths. Chapter three on the failure of the U.S. military in Vietnam--rejecting the idea popular among veterans that the politicians kept them from winning the war--alone is worth the price of the book. He also goes after the antiwar movement and argues in convincing fashion that it became the witting pawn of the North Vietnamese and that many of the leaders crossed the line between dissent and disloyalty. The chapter on American politics and culture is interesting, but he makes the United States far more historical conscious than is actually the case. It is also difficult to take serious an argument that claims Wisconsin and Oregon are part of New England. Few people will buy all his arguments, but he will make you stop and think a bit.

A serious topic makes for a delightful reading
Michael Lind has to be either the leading American intellectual alive or, a close competitor for that honor.With this lucid book, I was more than persuaded - indeed swept - into giving credence to Lind's arguments about the importance of the American involvement in Vietnam.Mr Lind draws from many sources in order to bolster his artfully weaved thesis.This book has history, analysis, and even some conjectures that are highly plausible.I am sure this book will become the standard against which similar books will be compared. In case that you are curious, here is Lind's verdict: "The Vietnam War was a just, constitutional and necessary proxy war in the Third World War that was waged by methods that were often counterproductive and sometimes arguably immoral.The war had to be fought in order to preserve the military and diplomatic credibility of the United States in the Cold War, ...." ... Read more

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In the late 1980s, Vietnam joined the global economy after decades of war and relative isolation, demonstrating how a former socialist government can adapt to global market forces with their neoliberal emphasis on freedom of choice for entrepreneurs and consumers. "The Ironies of Freedom" examines an aspect of this new market: commercial sex. Nguyen-vo offers an ambitious analysis of gender and class conflicts surrounding commercial sex as a site of market freedom, governmental intervention, and depictions in popular culture to argue that these practices reveal the paradoxical nature of neo-liberalism. What the case of Vietnam highlights is that governing with current neoliberal globalization may and does take paradoxical forms, sustained not by some vestige from times past but by contemporary conditions.Of mutual benefit to both the neoliberal global economy and the ruling party in Vietnam is the use of empirical knowledge and entrepreneurial and consumer's choice differentially among segments of the population to produce different kinds of labourers and consumers for the global market.But also of mutual benefit to both are the police, the prison, and notions of cultural authenticity enabled by a ruling party with well-developed means of coercion from its history.The freedom-unfreedom pair in governance creates a tension in modes of representation conducive to a new genre of sensational social realism in literature and popular films like the 2003 "Bar Girls" about two women in the sex trade, replete with nudity, booze, drugs, violence, and death. The movie opened in Vietnam with unprecedented box office receipts, blazing a trail for a commercially viable domestic film industry.Combining methods and theories from the social sciences and humanities, Nguyen-vo's analysis relies on fieldwork conducted in Ho Chi Minh City and its vicinity, in-depth interviews with informants, participant observation at selected sites of sexual commerce and governmental intervention, journalistic accounts, and literature and films.In the late 1980s, Vietnam joined the global economy after decades of war and relative isolation, demonstrating how a former socialist government can adapt to global market forces with their neoliberal emphasis on freedom of choice for entrepreneurs and consumers."The Ironies of Freedom" examines an aspect of this new market: commercial sex. Nguyen-vo offers an ambitious analysis of gender and class conflicts surrounding commercial sex as a site of market freedom, governmental intervention, and depictions in popular culture to argue that these practices reveal the paradoxical nature of neo-liberalism. What the case of Vietnam highlights is that governing with current neoliberal globalization may and does take paradoxical forms, sustained not by some vestige from times past but by contemporary conditions.Of mutual benefit to both the neoliberal global economy and the ruling party in Vietnam is the use of empirical knowledge and entrepreneurial and consumer's choice differentially among segments of the population to produce different kinds of labourers and consumers for the global market.But also of mutual benefit to both are the police, the prison, and notions of cultural authenticity enabled by a ruling party with well-developed means of coercion from its history.The freedom-unfreedom pair in governance creates a tension in modes of representation conducive to a new genre of sensational social realism in literature and popular films like the 2003 "Bar Girls" about two women in the sex trade, replete with nudity, booze, drugs, violence, and death. The movie opened in Vietnam with unprecedented box office receipts, blazing a trail for a commercially viable domestic film industry.Combining methods and theories from the social sciences and humanities, Nguyen-vo's analysis relies on fieldwork conducted in Ho Chi Minh City and its vicinity, in-depth interviews with informants, participant observation at selected sites of sexual commerce and governmental intervention, journalistic accounts, and literature and films. This book will appeal to historians and political scientists of Southeast Asia and to scholars of gender and sexuality, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and political theory dealing with neoliberalism.Thu-huong Nguyen-vo is assistant professor of Asian languages and cultures and Asian American studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. ... Read more

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During the Cold War, military conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan validated the importanct of war in global power dynamics. But military intervention proved not to be politically sustainable for the USA and the USSR. This study investigates the parallels and differences in the two conflicts. ... Read more

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Vietnam Foreign Policy and Government Guide ... Read more

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Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development traces the economic history of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975. During this period encompassing the Vietnam war, high-level officials paid relatively little attention to the economy of South Vietnam even though economic development was a necessary condition for the country's survival. A generous foreign aid program was designed to pay local troops and improve the standard of living of the population. Professor Dacy documents this growth in national income and the progress or lack thereof in a number of development indicators. He discusses the goals of United States economic aid and measures the net resources transferred. Additionally, the book analyzes wartime inflation and the Vietnamese tax system, and in so doing shows that the measures which would have promoted long-run viability were shunned in favor of short-run expediencies that practically doomed the country in the long run. Finally, economic development in South Vietnam is compared to that in Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan, three nations that faced high military threats during the same period. ... Read more

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Vietnam an Eye-witness Account by Suzanne Labin (Paperback - 1964) ... Read more

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In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles.Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by "chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government."Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States on a path toward massive military intervention which would ultimately destroy Johnson's presidency and polarize the American people.

Into the Quagmire presents a closely rendered, almost day-by-day account of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during those crucial nine months.Mining a wealth of recently opened material at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and elsewhere, Brian VanDeMark vividly depicts the painful unfolding of a national tragedy.We meet an LBJ forever fearful of a conservative backlash, which he felt would doom his Great Society, an unsure and troubled leader grappling with the unwanted burden of Vietnam; George Ball, a maverick on Vietnam, whose carefully reasoned (and, in retrospect, strikingly prescient) stand against escalation was discounted by Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy; and Clark Clifford, whose last-minute effort at a pivotal meeting at Camp David failed to dissuade Johnson from doubling the number of ground troops in Vietnam.What comes across strongly throughout the book is the deep pessimism of all the major participants as things grew worse--neither LBJ, nor Bundy, nor McNamara, nor Rusk felt confident that things would improve in South Vietnam, that there was any reasonable chance for victory, or that the South had the will or the ability to prevail against the North.And yet deeper into the quagmire they went.

Whether describing a tense confrontation between George Ball and Dean Acheson ("You goddamned old bastards," Ball said to Acheson, "you remind me of nothing so much as a bunch of buzzards sitting on a fence and letting the young men die") or corrupt politicians in Saigon, VanDeMark provides readers with the full flavor of national policy in the making.More important, he sheds greater light on why America became entangled in the morass of Vietnam. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Review of Into the Quagmire
Very often the American public has tended to view Lyndon Johnosn as the evil villian who escalated America's involvement in the warr in Vietnam.However, few people, including historians, know how the escalation came about.In this book Brian VanDeMark does not try to justify the decisions that were made between 1964 and 1968, but tries and explain how those decisions came about.VanDeMark also shows how Johnson slowly and reluctantly led the United States deeper into what has often been called the "quagmire" of Vietnam.VanDeMark balmes the American Policy maker's ignorance of the culture and politics of Southeast Asia for the slow deepening of the conflict.VanDeMark gives teh reader a very good view of how this happened by carrying the reader through almost every major decision made by the Johnson administration throughout this time period.Writen in a very readable style the near day-to-day account helps to emphasize the snowball effect of the events.The author uses a good range of source material for this book.THere is a strong reliance on government manuscripts and primary sources of the administration.He also includes oral histories and interviews.It is by using these sources and many quotations that VanDeMark is able to carry the reader through the day-to-day accounts of what happened.This book is very important for anyone interested in the VIetnam war or American foreign policy. ... Read more