Product Description
Often portrayed as an inept and stubborn tyrant, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem has long been the subject of much derision but little understanding. Philip Catton’s penetrating study provides a much more complex portrait of Diem as both a devout patriot and a failed architect of modernization. In doing so, it sheds new light on a controversial regime.

Catton treats the Diem government on its own terms rather than as an appendage of American policy. Focusing on the decade from Dien Bien Phu to Diem’s assassination in 1963, he examines the Vietnamese leader’s nation-building and reform efforts—particularly his Strategic Hamlet Program, which sought to separate guerrilla insurgents from the peasantry and build grassroots support for his regime. Catton’s evaluation of the collapse of that program offers fresh insights into both Diem’s limitations as a leader and the ideological and organizational weaknesses of his government, while his assessment of the evolution of Washington’s relations with Saigon provides new insight into America’s growing involvement in the Vietnamese civil war.

Focusing on the Strategic Hamlet Program in Binh Duong province as an exemplar of Diem’s efforts, Catton paints the Vietnamese leader as a progressive thinker trying to simultaneously defeat the communists and modernize his nation. He draws on a wealth of Vietnamese language sources to argue that Diem possessed a firm vision of nation-building and sought to overcome the debilitating dependence that reliance on American support threatened to foster. As Catton shows, however, Diem’s plans for South Vietnam clashed with those of the United States and proved no match for the Vietnamese communists.

Catton analyzes the mutually frustrating interactions between Diem and the administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy, and reveals patterns in this uneasy alliance that have eluded other observers. He also clarifies many of the problems, setbacks, and miscalculations experienced by the communist movement during that era.

Neither an American puppet, as communist propaganda claimed, nor a backward-looking mandarin, according to Western accounts, Catton’s Diem is a tragic figure who finally ran out of time, just a few weeks before JFK’s assassination and at a moment when it still seemed possible for America to avoid war.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

A telling tale of political misakes... but
This book has very detailed information regarding three major POLITICAL blunders that contributed to the collapse of the Diem regime, but omits some of the more important reasons that the American supported Coup eventually ousted him, and led to his and his brother's death.

The Buddhist crisis of 1963 and the constant antagonizing overtures made by his brother, Nhu against the American's, were breezed over, despite them being prominent reasons for America finally giving up on his leadership skills.

Catton's Success Explaining Diem's Failure
This is the first book that I have read about this period that really puts the Vietnamese side of this drama in center stage. I happened to serve in Vietnam during a couple of years while Diem's was President and had the advantage of speaking fairly fluent Vietnamese and have always thought that the 'Last Mandarin' image of Diem was quite off base. Catton actually manages to explain 'Personalism' , something that Diem himself had trouble doing to the people of Vietnam. The book does not attempt to whitewash any of Diem's many faultsbut does show Diem to actually be a modern nationalist who was determined to follow his own own agenda for nation building . It was this determination to follow his own agenda that was the major source of friction with his American backers. This book is a must read for any serious student of the war as it was the overthrow of Diem that really brought about the Americanization of the war.

Lessons fortoday from early involvement in Vietnam
This is probably the definitive book on the reign of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Every serious student of the American involvement in Vietnam should find this background on how we got into that mess in the first place well worth reading. It describes Diem's background, character and personality and explains why not only Diem himself but also the vast cultural differences between the Americans and the Vietnamese made for an extremely difficult relationship.

It also has current value as the United States searches for leaders we can work with in parts of the world that are as new to intense American involvement as Vietnam was in the 1950s and 60s. A better understanding of what we did wrong in Vietnam may help us to avoid repeating those same mistakes. My personal opinion, reinforced by this book, is that if we have only a lame horse to bet on then we would be better off not betting in that particular race.

Catton's many examples show how out of touch the Ngo family was with the majority of the Vietnamese people. Diem was an arrogant, opinionated bachelor, a Catholic in a nation that was 93 percent Buddhist. One of his brothers was a Catholic bishop and Catton describes "the sectarian character of the Diem regime." Another brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, served as "Political Counselor"--and enforcer. Catton describes him as the regime's "Rastputin." Nhu's wife was probably the worst female government spokesman since Marie Antoinette. Madame Nhu referred to the suicides of burning bonzes as "barbecues." When I first arrived in Vietnam in 1966 she was still infamous as "The Dragon Lady."

The author expanded what was originally a graduate student paper about the Strategic Hamlet program in 1961-1963 into a doctoral dissertation that was more focused on Diem, his government, and their developing relationship with the Americans. With that background, we should expect excellent documentation and indeed the 203 pages of text are backed up by 59 pages of notes.

However, it is still possible for a nitpicker to find a few gaps. For example, his bibliography includes the U.S. Army's Military History Institute but not its Center of Military History. "The Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group" is mentioned three times but we are not told what it was. My local guide in Plieku in 1999 spoke excellent English because he had spent a year at Michigan State University. (The downside was that it earned him a year in jail after the communist takeover.) What was the Michigan connection?Faced with being dumped by his American allies "Diem won a dramatic reprieve with a military victory over the Binh Xuyen (a mafia type crime organization) at the end of April 1955." How could he win "a military victory" over a bunch of civilian gangsters?

Catton apparently speaks and reads Vietnamese, which undoubtedly provides advantages in research and opens doors for him that are not available to most American authors of books about Vietnam. Even though the English language literature on Vietnam is vast, some of the information he provides from the many referenced books and articles in Vietnamese may well be published here for the first time

Diem continually carped and complained about the type and amount of U.S. aid but resisted doing the things the Americans wanted in return. In Stilwell and the American Experience in China, Barbara Tuchman relates Stilwell's complaints about our government's failure to demand a quid pro quo from our Chinese allies in return for the aid we provided them. We had the same problem in Vietnam. The more we did for them the less the Vietnamese did for themselves. I read Stilwell in the spring of 1972 during my second tour as an advisor to a Vietnamese Army unit in the field. Our failure to demand, and Vietnamese failure to provide, a quid pro quo was still a problem nine years after Philip Catton described this exchange between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Diem in 1963:

"`Isn't there some one thing you may think of that is within your capabilities to do and that would favorably impress U.S. opinion[?]" Lodge asked finally. Diem gave the ambassador `a blank look and changed the subject.'" ... Read more

Product Description
Shadow of the Dragon examines the long historical cycle of tribute, domination, and independence that has shaped Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations. After generations of bloody struggle for independence and a slow crawl toward prosperity, Vietnam has reached a crossroads. The Vietnamese can fall back into their historically predetermined fate of kowtowing to their large neighbor, China, or they can continue to stand alone, forging their own developmental path.

Henry Kenny outlines what role the United States can play in encouraging Vietnamese growth and prosperity while protecting U.S. interests and easing the Chinese hegemonic tendency without humiliating Beijing. The analysis addresses potential tinderboxes in the Con Son Basin, the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the Gulf of Tonkin. ... Read more

Product Description
Fought as fiercely by politicians and the public as by troops in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam War--its origins, its conduct, its consequences--is still being contested. In what will become the classic account, based on newly opened archival sources, David Kaiser rewrites what we know about this conflict. Reviving and expanding a venerable tradition of political, diplomatic, and military history, he shows not only why we entered the war, but also why our efforts were doomed to fail.American Tragedy is the first book to draw on complete official documentation to tell the full story of how we became involved in Vietnam--and the story it tells decisively challenges widely held assumptions about the roles of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Using an enormous range of source materials from these administrations, Kaiser shows how the policies that led to the war were developed during Eisenhower's tenure and nearly implemented in the closing days of his administration in response to a crisis in Laos; how Kennedy immediately reversed course on Laos and refused for three years to follow recommendations for military action in Southeast Asia; and how Eisenhower's policies reemerged in the military intervention mounted by the Johnson administration. As he places these findings in the context of the Cold War and broader American objectives, Kaiser offers the best analysis to date of the actual beginnings of the war in Vietnam, the impact of the American advisory mission from 1962 through 1965, and the initial strategy of General Westmoreland. A deft re-creation of the deliberations, actions, and deceptions that brought two decades of post-World War II confidence to an ignominious end, American Tragedy offers unparalleled insight into the Vietnam War at home and abroad--and into American foreign policy in the 1960s. David Kaiser, professor in the Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College, is the author of many books, including Politics and War. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (11)

Outstanding
Contrary to the single critical review by Mr. Hanlon, below, this book is truly outstanding.It's not intended as the be-all and end-all of our involvement in Vietnam; rather, it's a thorough and exhaustive account of the White House deliberative process that got us into a full-scale (and ultimately disastrous) involvement in that war.I haven't seen any book that covered that subject as thoroughly.It's obviously vastly superior to the self-serving accounts of the architects of that war, such as McNamara's, and it discusses recently declassified materials not found anywhere else.

Breathtaking!
It has been said that the study of history represents at once both an exercise in pure aesthetics and a practical guide to the understanding of the present.This volume, as thoroughly researched as it is spectacular in its presentation, is an apt illustration of that notion.

The author has done a magnificent service for those of us who have an interest in contemporary American and Cold War history.We owe a great debt to David Halberstam and those who came after him; this author goes far beyond and delves far more deeply than they did.After absorbing what I could from this work, I am far more enlightened about the origins of the calamity that American involvement in SE Asia represented.

This work is highly readable; the final chapter alone is more than worth the price of entry.

Excellent; 4.5
This is a very careful, detailed analysis of decision making in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations about the extent of American involvement in Vietnam.Based on meticulous and original archival research, Kaiser sets the decisions of both the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses against the background of the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration.While a number of scholars have presented Eisenhower's Cold War policy as relatively cautious and non-confrontational, Kaiser argues that in many respects the Eisenhower era policies were relatively aggressive and rigidly confrontational.Kaiser account rings true.While Eisenhower was cautious about direct confrontations with the Soviet Union and China, in the Third World his administration pursued aggressive policies towards regimes that were suspected to have leftist elements, such as the Arbenz regime in Guatemala or the Mossadegh regime in Iran.When Kennedy assumed office, the State Dept. and Pentagon were imbued with and preferred to carry forward Eisenhower era approaches.The Kennedy administration also inherited the problem of South Vietnam and our less than satisfactory ally, the authoritarian and progressively corrupt Diem regime.By the early 1960s, the Communist regime of North Vietnam had reactivated their efforts to reunite Vietnam.Kennedy was pressed by many of his advisors to pursue an agressive course in Vietnam, up to and including a large US presence in Vietnam, invasion of the North, and even the use of nuclear weapons, all consistent with Eisenhower era policies.Kaiser's depiction of Kennedy is quite interesting.He shows him to be quite intelligent and knowledgeable about foreign affairs, skeptical about the policies suggested by the Pentagon and State Dept., and very good at encouraging diverse opinions among his advisors.At the same time, Kaiser presents considerable documentation that many of our diplomatic and military leaders fundamentally misunderstood events in Southeast Asia.From a diplomatic point of view, overemphasizing the importance of Vietnam and from a military point of view, completely misunderstanding the nature of the challenge posed by the insurgency in South Vietnam.Kennedy's confidence and skepticism led him to resist suggestions for major American involvement and Kaiser makes a good case he would have continued in this vein in a second term in office.
The case of Johnson is quite different.Johnson wanted to be a great domestic president, and almost achieved that status.Johnson, however, was less experienced in foreign policy, more doctrinaire in his anti-communism, and more deferential to the Pentagon and the State Dept., ultimately accepting the case for a major US involvement in Vietnam.Kaiser has a nice description of the relatively deceitful manner in which the Johnson administration went about proceeding to war, something that would have major consequences later on.
Kaiser presents the decision to make a major US commitment in Vietnam as a spectacular and avoidable error brought by doctrinaire anti-communism, refusal to consider quite a bit of contrary data and dissenting opinions, overconfidence in the value of military force, and excessive concentration on the problems of Southeast Asia.
My one criticism of Kaiser is that he tends to interpret actions of many of the major actors in terms of generational effects.Many of the major US decision makers were members of the GI generation whose experience with WWII had apparently taught them the power of American military power and the dangers of what they saw as appeasement.He looks at other actors from the point of view of their important generational experiences.This is a reasonable point but Kaiser tends to apply it in an excessively deterministic fashion.

Another incomplete rehash of Vietnam lore
The frightening aspect of this work is that it is simply another glazing over of what Americans call the Vietnam War.The sources consulted do not constitute anything resembling a full scope of available scholarship.Americans do not understand the Indochina conflict because they are only allowed to see one side.This book is simply another work in a long line of American political lore which has created convenient rationalization for complex events in Southeast Asia.There are significant scholarly works available for the reader who desires true understanding.This work is certainly not to be held among them.

A detailed account of the US entry into Vietnam
David Kaiser has accessed newly released documents to write an excellent book. He has chronologed the day by day decisions and opinions of the men at the upper levels of the government that led America into the Vietnam War.We see how Eisenhower's men wanted to commit troops to stop the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia, especially in Laos. Then we see how Kennedy's people continued these policies, while Kennedy reigned them in and wanted to move more carefully.
Kaiser shows us the different agendas.How Diem did not want to use his troops against the Viet Cong, but rather to keep him in power. Diem refused to give any of his military officers enough power to fight the Viet Cong for fear they would plot a coup. He only gave his officers enough force to show the governments strength, keeping Diem and his family in power.
After Kennedy was assassinated Lyndon Johnson inherited Kennedy's advisors, but did not keep a reign on them, so the government made commitments to sendtroops into Vietnam. Even after Diems death, the Vietnamese only wanted to continue their troops in their power plays instead of fighting the Viet Cong. McNamara and Rusk continued to lead us into war and Lyndon Johnson agreed with them. Ball continuously tried to slow the slide to commitment down, but Johnson and his advisors ignored him.
Kaiser argues that the opinions each man held depended on when he was born. He explains that some were born, and grew up during the 30s and 40s during what he calls the GI generation. Because of this they believed that the United States could achieve anything. Kaiser also points out that the arrival of World War 2 also affected their opinions. Rusk devoutly believed that we had to stop the communists in Vietnam, or there would be another World War. Johnson also held this all or nothing viewpoint. Kennedy on the other hand held a more sophisticated view, placing Vietnam behind other problems, unlike Johnson.
Kaiser shows how Johnson and his advisors refused to negotiate with North Vietnam unless North Vietnam gave us everything we asked for first. An unlikely event. Eventually Johnson and others lied about the problems to keep the commitments increasing. Johnson also tended to ignore other foreign policy problems.
Kaiser's writing usually moves easily so it is not as hard to read as it might have been, given the complexity and detail of the subject matter. ... Read more

Product Description
The Vietnam War was unlike any war the United States ever fought. Unlike the previous wars of the twentieth century, the Vietnam War left the United States divided, and it continues to influence U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Without question, the Vietnam Syndrome that emerged after the war's end altered the policies of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and the lessons learned from the war were applied to later conflicts in the Persian Gulf.

The Vietnam War story is one that has never been fully understood and probably never will be explained to the satisfaction of those who experienced it – and it will continue to spark debate and controversy for each new generation. The Vietnam War For Dummies attempts to tell that complicated story in a way that is easily accessible to everyone. If you've never read much about the Vietnam War, this book provides a general overview that covers all the major players and significant turning points and events of the war. If you're a history buff, this book can serve as a compact reference guide to the major subjects of the war.

The Vietnam War For Dummies covers the following topics and more:

Customer Reviews (2)

Prophetic take by renowned historian on Vietnam?
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. is a renowned author and historian.He is currently the Albert Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities, and professor in history at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York.He has written numerous books, including two Pulitzer Prize winners; The Age of Jackson (1946) and A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965). His major historical work was The Age of Roosevelt; a three volume set that examined the New Deal.Schlesinger has been active in politics as well, serving as an adviser to Adlai Stevenson and to JFK during their presidential campaigns, and was later appointed a special assistant for Latin-American affairs during the Kennedy administration.

The Vietnam War was one of this country's saddest sagas.Perhaps only during the Civil War did the people of this country so divide amongst themselves.A war thousands of miles away, an unclear goal, and a dishonest government all contributed to this division.A much heralded historical author, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. looked at the unrest and instability, and traced the war back to its roots, all the way back to Franklin Roosevelt's administration from his view in 1967 in The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966.

Schlesinger traces the conflict all the way back to 1941, the first time that Vietnam involved the United States in a conflict.The Japanese had moved into Indochina and FDR saw that as a threat to the U.S. because their occupation would give them a base for larger aggression in Southeast Asia, and it jeopardized the then important supply of natural rubber.The French had held colonial rule over Indochina for nearly one hundred years, and even though France was an American ally, FDR had no plans for this rule to continue after and Allied victory in World War II.As Roosevelt put it, "France has had the country-thirty million inhabitants-for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning."FDR's plan was to set an international trusteeship over the area promoting Indochina's new independence.Perhaps had this plan been carried out much bloodshed could have been avoided.Instead the world paid little attention to the area and France tried to re-establish colonial rule, but was met by opposition by a Vietnamese Communist named Ho Chi Minh.The same Ho Chi Minh that had let and anti-Japanese movement in WWII, and had worked closely with the American office of Strategic Services.The U.S. paid little attention to the fighting there until 1949 when China fell under communism.In 1954, President Eisenhower explained "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over quickly."The Domino Theory entered political vocabulary.China had fallen, now it was starting to spread.

The French struggled in Vietnam and pleaded for U.S. military intervention, but Eisenhower doubted unilateral cooperation.He tried to convince British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to intervene.He compared the conflict in Indochina to failing the halt of Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito--but Churchill did not see it as being that big of a problem and feared involvement might lead to another world war.

Many senators in the U.S. Congress questioned involvement including senators John F. Kennedy and the Democratic leader in the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as major general.Eisenhower was able to "escape" the troubles of Vietnam when he left office in 1961, giving way to Kennedy.JFK started sending military advisors to Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese army, but each small step taken was followed up by a slightly bigger step and further escalation until 1965 when the U.S. had 184,000 troops in the jungles of Vietnam.When LBJ took office he saw himself deeply involved in the conflict, although he had opposed involvement while in Congress.By 1967 he had 400,000 troops in Vietnam.Despite outnumbering the North Vietnamese Army (including the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South) ten to one, and having the ability to blow up the entire world, the U.S. could not defeat the communists because of the rugged conditions and the guerrilla tactics.The Viet Cong looked like everyday civilians by day, but by night it was quite a different story, thus many civilian lives were lost in the process.Many civilians would be killed just trying to kill a few Viet Cong.Encouraging reports came from the U.S. government saying the end was near, but the reality proved to be much different.

The U.S. had the ability to wipe out the North Vietnamese, there is no question about that.However, did China await?Schlesinger points out how MacArthur had doubted the Chinese in Korea and what happened there, but also said it was a very different situation this time around.North Korea was a state of the Chinese and thy feared losing it and an American attack onto Chinese mainland.Schlesinger believed de-escalation was the only solution.Many in the government, including President Johnson, feared it would be too big of a blow to the nation's pride and would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of the rest of the world.Nobody wanted to be remembered as the president that lost the war.The U.S. did de-escalate years after the book during Nixon's term and finally the last troops were brought home in 1973.

Arthur Schlesinger is a wonderful historical writer and has added many insights in his books, including this one.There were two major things in this book that could have been clarified to a greater detail.For one, he denounced China has being a real threat to the U.S.Had the U.S. really made this an all-out war with the Vietnames Communists and sought total victory, instead of just trying to preserve South Vietnam as a free nation, China would have came to their aid to preserve the communist ideal, maybe even Russia.China considered itself the center of communism and would not have let Vietnam fall to an "imperialistic" United States.Look at it through their eyes: What if thousands of Chinese troops came and occupied the U.S.' southern border of Mexico?What if they were setting up military bases there, trying to defend their ideals?There would certainly be repercussions.

The second issue Schlesinger's proposal of de-escalation.This book was written six years before the U.S. actually did pull troops, so maybe he is a prophet, but he does not tell how he would win the war, or at least leave by gaining something.He says de-escalation "could work, if there were the will to pursue it."What does he mean by "work"?Get out and save American lives?Yes, de-escalation is the answer there.But if he means "work" by pulling out troops yet still gain "victories", both politically and militarily with the Vietnamese Communists, he should have explained how.

All in all, this was a well-written book by a terrific historical author.Schlesinger does not paint any pictures for the reader (nor does he include any in the book), just presents the facts and his take on them.

A Remarkable Book With Important Lessons About Iraq
There isn't an argument made today supporting our invasion of Iraq that wasn't made forty years ago in favor of the war in Viet Nam.There isn't a criticism of the war's opponents being offered today that does not echo the positions voiced four decades ago.

Prof. Schlesinger demolishes the war advocates and brilliantly bolsters those who stand up and object to a policy and an administration that is headed 180 degrees in the wrong direction.

Does criticism of the present administration embolden our enemy?(Please see page 9 of the paperback edition.)Are objections to the Iraq war unpatriotic?(Pages 53-55.)Prof. Schlesinger points out "It is hardly prudent for any President to insist on a conception of unity which, on closer examination, means no more than unquestioning acceptance of government policy...Criticism of a war always cheers up the enemy; but I do not recall that any government official admonished Abraham Lincoln to stop criticizing the Mexican War on the ground that it gave aid and comfort to Santa Anna." (Page 118.)And he quotes Secretary McNamara"'This is a nation in which the freedom of dissent is absolutely fundamental.'"(Page 122.)

Does this problem have a military solution? (Page 39.)"'My feeling,' General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, `is that we could kill every Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war.Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we set.'" (Page 48.)

Now this Administration has proposed the "Surge" Strategy.In other words, it's just going to take one more military step [escalation] (pages 31-33).Or, as Prof. Schlesinger summarizes this approach:"The theory, of course, is that widening the war will shorten it."

We've received continued optimistic progress reports and predictions in the face of evidence to the contrary (page 24).Yet the war's advocates suggest the public's perception of failure is the fault of the press (page 26).Indeed, is there a justification for preventive war? (Pages 94-95.) And, once again, we see how a puppet government leverages American support (page 112).

What if the people do not support the present course of action?Each President remains "accountable at the bar of public opinion for every act of this administration."- Andrew Jackson (page 32)

Is world opinion important?(Pages 56-57.)"'An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government...'"- James Madison, 63rd Federalist (page 58)."If our credibility is the issue, it is rather more important that other countries believe in our intelligence and responsibility than our passion for over-kill."- Prof. Schlesinger (pages 115-116).

If we leave, is this another "Munich?""In the years since [World War II], the consciousness of policy-makers has been haunted by the Munich and Yalta analogies - the generalization ...that appeasement always assures new aggression...The multitude of errors committed in the name of `Munich' may exceed the original error of 1938."(Pages 89-92)"There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."- George Kennan (page 115).There is also the view of Winston Churchill: "I would not sacrifice my own generation to a principal however high or a truth however great."(Page 97.)

We are fighting this war at a frightful financial cost (page 50).And there is "the most serious cost of all - a cost both domestic and foreign:the ebbing away of belief in the American government.It is an irony that a war undertaken to demonstrate the credibility of the American word should end in erosion of confidence in American integrity and purpose."(Page 64.)"...the intensity of the national administration's commitment to the Bill of Rights can make a vital difference." - Prof. Schlesinger (page 117).

Happily, Prof. Schlesinger offers not only history but also hope.In Chapter VIII. ("A Middle Course"):"Are these the only alternatives:disorderly and humiliating withdrawal or enlarging the war?Surely our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt."(Pages 99-101.)

When this book was published approximately 4,000 US military personnel had lost their lives in Viet Nam.The final tally of the butcher's bill was over twelve times that terrible number.I wish more people had read this in 1967 - and I wish every member of the Senate and House would read it today. ... Read more

Product Description
A powerful and vivid account of Vietnam, one of the most beautiful, ravaged, and misunderstood countries in the world

In Shadows and Wind, Robert Templer paints a fascinating and fresh picture of a country usually viewed with hazy nostalgia or deep suspicion. Here is Hanoi, an increasingly tense and troubled city approaching its millennium but uncertain of its direction. Here are people emerging from a long wilderness of malnutrition, discovering a new lifestyle of leisure and luxury. And everywhere are the anomalies that burst the bubble of optimism: a vastly expensive luxury hotel sitting empty in an unknown town six hours from an international airport; museums crammed with fake exhibits. And there remains the one-party Communist state, still wrapped in secrecy and corruption, and making for an uneasy bedfellow with the rapacious capitalism it now encourages.

Drawing on hundreds of interviews in Vietnam and years of research, Robert Templer has produced the first in-depth examination of the problems facing modern Vietnam. Shadows and Wind is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the Vietnam that now has emerged from a century of conflict with both foreign powers and with itself.

"Groundbreaking. . . . In a convincing blend of colorful reportage and trenchant analysis, Robert Templer blows away the myths that have misinformed the world about this deeply troubled country."--Jeremy Grant, The Financial Times

"A meticulous and fascinating investigation.. . . For anyone interested in the real legacy of the Vietnam War, this book should be compulsory reading."--The Guardian ... Read more

Customer Reviews (26)

Helpful context: A dated, but fascinating overview of Vietnam up to mid-90's.
Templer's Shadow and Wind is a bit dated, but fascinating view of Vietnam up to 10 years ago when it was beginning to shed the shackles of 30+ years of disastrous socialism and single-party control.Most of the population is now a younger generation (born after 1975) who have come of age at a time when they can embrace some free-market reforms, and take advantage of personal choices and a growing economy.This book explains what life was like for the older folks, the corrosive effects of corruption, communism and abusive state control, and many complex layers of Vietnamese history and culture.

I worked as a volunteer for a month in Vietnam, and found this book helpful in providing a broad context: identifying and breaking stereotypes; relating history to current culture and society; and understanding challenges involving HIV, corruption, literature, youth, etc.

Only Drawbacks:
Very detailed and wordy, but a reader can jump between many well-organized chapters.
Written before the widespread effects of open Internet access became apparent.

Engaging and Fascinating
There are so very many books about Vietnam, I was hesitant when I picked this up, and I expected to be disappointed. On the contrary - I was immediately engaged and found myself eager to get some time alone so I could keep reading.

The book really kept my interest, and has a unique view of modern Vietnam. I highly recommend this book for people who want to learn about modern Vietnam and the national psyche.

Contemporary Look At Vietnam
While in Vietnam I picked up an interesting book about contemporary Vietnam called Shadows and Wind by Robert Templer. Anyway, after my first trip to Vietnam I read Stanley Karnow's excellent history, Vietnam, which focuses on the cuses of the war and the aftermath and I felt this might be a follow up of sorts, picking up where Karnow left off. It's not as contemporary as I'd like-it was published in 1998, but the author has interesting insights to make about the myth of Vietnam, the culture, the generation gap, food, politics, Viet Kieu (exiled or refugee Vietnamese), religion, and everyday life. Albeit the chapters on politics were long and difficult to get through-they came in the middle of the book, which seemed to slow me in my progress. However, I found the opening and closing chapters the most interesting and informative about contemporary Vietnamese society and from what I saw on my last trip to Hanoi-it is still fairly accurate. The Vietnamese are slowing making their way to the usual global consumerism with their pursuit of Honda Dream motorcycles, cell phones, and other consumer goods, but the governement has kept economic expansion moving at a trickle compared to other countries. More than half of the population was born after the war and no one ever gave me grief because I was an American. It'll be interesting to see whether or not Vietnam develops an economic model like China.

One of Two Great books on Vietnam!
I read this book because it was recommended in the back of my favorite book on Vietnam: The Bamboo Chest: An Adventure in Healing the Trauma of War

After reading this book I can understand why Mr. Graham recommended it in his book The Bamboo Chest, and why there are so many who've read both The Bamboo Chest: An Adventure in Healing the Trauma of War and Shadows And Wind and consider them the two best books on Vietnam in recent years. As a Vietnamese-American I can definitely attest to the both authors' understanding of the topic of Vietnam: one author gained his through living and reporting on Vietnam for three years, and the other through living in Vietnam during the worst years of the War, and spending eleven months in a re-education camp, just like my uncle!

Get The Bamboo Chest and Shadows and Wind and you'll have a complete understanding of Vietnam and its people!

Get the facts behind the headlines!
This book and memoir "The Bamboo Chest: An Adventure in Healing the Trauma of War" by Frederick "Cork Graham are the best books on Vietnam that my reading club and I have read in the last ten years. Both of them stories that have never been told by any other writers who appear only to be regurgitating the findings of previous writers many of them long since dead. If you really want to know what is behind the veil of secrecy in Vietnam then these "Shadows and Wind" and "The Bamboo Chest" are the books for you! Both are written by authors who spent more than a year in Vietnam. Graham spent eleven months as the first american political prisoner held in that country since the end of outright fighting. ... Read more

Product Description

The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple perspectives for decades, but domestic considerations -- such as partisan politics and election-year maneuvering -- are often overlooked as determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest war.

In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican Party -- its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administration -- on the escalation, prosecution, and resolution of the Vietnam War. This groundbreaking work also sheds new light on the relationship between Congress and the imperial presidency as they struggled for control over U.S. foreign policy.

Beginning his analysis in 1961 and continuing through the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, Johns argues that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations failed to achieve victory on both fronts of the Vietnam War -- military and political -- because of their preoccupation with domestic politics. Johns details the machinations and political dexterity required of all three presidents and of members of Congress to maneuver between the countervailing forces of escalation and negotiation, offering a provocative account of the ramifications of their decisions. With clear, incisive prose and extensive archival research, Johns's analysis covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the president in U.S. foreign relations.

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Foreword by Richard Holbrooke. Five American and three Vietnamese participants in the early days of U.S. involvement in southeast Asia compellingly argue that the failure of American policy in Vietnam was not inevitable. The common theme of their individual essays suggests that the war in Vietnam might have had a much different--and far less tragic--outcome if U.S. policy makers had listened to experts with experience in Asia and combating communist revolutionary warfare and pursued a coherent and consistent counterinsurgency strategy instead of militarizing and Americanizing the struggle. The authors point out that against the advice of experts and the proven success of counterinsurgency programs in Malaya and the Philippines, senior policy makers made the fateful decision to develop the South Vietnamese Army as a mirror image of the U.S. Army rather than as a counter-guerilla force.

The authors, who were involved in all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign, also cite as key factors in American policy failure: support for the coup that overthrew President Diem in 1963, bureaucratic in-fighting, and the lack of appreciation for the complexities of revolutionary warfare and the practicalities of grass-roots programs to combat it. A vivid account of that coup is included in the book with fresh insight into the pivotal event. Two essays written by former South Vietnamese senior officers who once fought with Communist Viet Minh forces provide a unique perspective of how both sides thought and functioned. While this devastating portrait can do nothing to change what has already transpired, it does offer significant lessons for the future and should not be ignored. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (6)

Interesting.
These are the views of seven people, Americans and Vietnamese, who in the early sixties contended that the US should pursue a counterinsurgency approach instead of a full conventional war against the Viet Cong, only to be brushed aside by the Johnson/McNamara group. They suggested that once the "war for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people" was won, the communist threat should disappear.

Although I do not believe counterinsurgency war alone is the only valid approach because of 1) the presence of 200,000 Viet Cong left behind in South Vietnam by Hanoi in 1954, 2) the determination of Hanoi to conquer Saigon, 3) the opening of the Ho Chi Minh trail , this unconvential approach should have been tried first. Had it been combined with a complete interdiction of the trail, victory would have been more likely with less deployment of US troops.

What we have to remember is that the unique, and only goal of Hanoi was to conquer Saigon, no matter the cost in human lives and the time needed to achieve this goal.

The Unknow War to Save South Vietnam
To most Americans, the war in Vietnam began in March 1965 with the arrival of the U.S. Marines across the beach at Danang...But a handful of young American civilians had entered the war five years' earlier...Thousands more followed as the entire American Governent was mobilized to "win in Vietnam"..until it became obvious only the South Vietnamese themselves could obtain a victory.. This book offers an insight into the efforts, the successes andthe failures of these first Americans; and how we often were our own worst enemy...I had the privilege of serving as one of these men.PRELUDE TO TRAGEDY provides a unique insider look at how dedicated --and desperate--young Americans tried to head off the final outcome...Not a book for casual readers looking for combat stories, but a "must read" for any serious student of the Vietnam conflict.

The Greater Tragedy
'Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam'looks beyond the curtain of lies concocted by Johnson & McNamara in 1964.A simple truth remains too devastating for mainstream publication.Johnson pulled the trigger on the American War in Vietnam by ordering retaliatory strikes three months prior to the election of 1964.No mere coincidence. Johnson did so to win the election.No other factor accounts for Johnson's arrogant insistance on immediate retaliation to an event which never occurred. A 24 hour delay would have revealed there was no Tonkin Gulf attack as claimed. Johnson adamantly demanded an immediate attack for he feared any delay would deny him the use of his trump card as CinC. Air strikes were used to defeat Goldwater. Johnson won the election then defeated himself by his arrogant miss use of military power.Johnson's effort to intimidate Ho Chi Minh failed miserably. Ho recognized retaliatory strikes as the superficial show of force it was. Without a commitment to win Johnson's efforts were doomed to failure from the start. Certain defeat was recognized, long before Johnson stepped aside in '68.'Prelude'provides evidence of the impending tragedy as it unfolded.However the most damming evidence was left out. The purpose of the air strike was to win the election. Johnson's fear, greed & grasp for power must be recognized if we are to avoid future acts of arrogance leading to war by a renegade president. Our constitution did not grant dictatorial power to a ruthless tyrant. How then, did Johnson acquire sufficient power to over ride congressional restraint & military dissent?He did so by lies, deceit & intimidation for all who stood in his way including his Vice President.Humphrey was denied access to LBJ's inner circle of advisors on Vietnam. JCS members were blocked from attending crucial strategy sessions.Johnson reduced JCS members to pawns, merely carrying out miss guided 'strategies' concocted by McNamara & his 'War Room' of civilian 'experts'. Military officers were intimidated, insulted, humiliated & ignored by Johnson. Military strategies were dictated by Johnson's political agenda.Without a compelling national security threat, military logic or justification for acts of war in Vietnam, Johnson created the ruse of a Tonkin Gulf attack to over ride congressional & military reluctance to war. He then launched unprovoked acts of war to enhance his political image. Johnson's arrogance in resorting to war to win the '64 election is supported by evidence presented in 'Prelude to Tragedy'. The authors failure to state this self evident fact is understandable. Doing so would have invited disbelief, criticism and ostracism. Lies perpetrated by Johnson & McNamara have been assimilated into the very fiber of American perceptions of defeat in Vietnam. The dregs remain today. American foreign policy remains a threat to many, including our allies.Claims of justification for American efforts in Vietnam no longer hold water. 'Prelude to Tragedy' puts an end to McNamara's claim of a well intentioned humanitarian effort. It reveals false claims & deceit by LBJ then and McNamara now in their efforts to distort the reality & rewrite history.American aggression in Vietnam must be revealed & recognized if we are to restore a balance of power. Existing presidential powers enable incumbents to initiate acts of war without the advice or consent of congress.The War Powers Resolution has been ignored by presidents as unconstitutional. This breach of our constitution must first be recognized if it is to be corrected. Americans have yet to grasp this essential lesson from defeat in Vietnam. Failure to curb presidential war powers and restore the balance of power leaves the tragedy without redeeming value. The least we can do is make full use of lessons learned in Vietnam. This nation will not endure without an effective balance between congressional & presidential powers. Will Americans awaken in time to turn the ship of state around before running aground on another distant shore for the sake of political expediency? Or will McNamara & others succeed in efforts to rewrite that tragic chapter? This book contributes to an essential dialog. Recognition of "The Greater Tragedy" may follow. 'Dereliction of Duty' and 'The Wrong War' provide further insight into this American tragedy.

Unique contribution to Viet-Nam war history
Prelude to Tragedy is one of the very few books ever published that focuses on the anti-poverty and civilian development roles of the United States in Viet-Nam.It does so with information and perspectives that have been almost universally ignored in all the writing that's appeared on this sad period of history.As such, and because it is written by key leaders at a crucial early stage of the American war in that country, it makes a unique contribution to our understanding of why the American effort failed on the political plane and therefore also on the military plane.The writers are extraordinarily committed Americans and Vietnamese who proved to have a far better understanding of Vietnamese civilian realities than the higher-ranking policy-makers who refused to pay them heed. In fact, their observations and conclusions inform and reinforce from additional perspectives those reached by Don Luce and me in our own book, Viet-Nam -- The Unheard Voices.The fact that those of us with expertise that came from living and working among the Vietnamese people themselves, from hearing the concerns they raised and the causes they espoused, were not taken sufficiently seriously -- indeed, that Robert McNamara had the gall to deny the existence of anyone who understood Viet-Nam and could have informed the highest American policy-makers -- is enough to make one angry all over again.But anger is not the correct response; the point is to learn for the future.And in this sense, and even after such a lapse of time, a wide readership for Prelude to Tragedy may hopefully help prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Road Less Travelled
America's strategy in the conduct of the war in Vietnam largely followed the model of attrition warfare. However, underneath the search and destroy tactics existed a sporadic application of maneuver warfare principles which were successfully manifested through counterinsurgency methods. As Marines, we should be familiar with the maneuver mindset behind III MAF's combined action program (Warfighting MCDP 1, p.39). Nonetheless, long before the Marines' adopted unconventional methods in Vietnam, government civilians effectively utilized principles of maneuver warfare. Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam 1960-1965 is their story as told by five American and three Vietnamese field operatives who loyally attempted, but failed to inject unconventional warfare into our mainstream national strategy. The book also provides profound insights on the importance of cultural education and morality during wartime and operation other than war. Central to the authors' efforts were maneuver concepts such as: knowing the enemy, identifying his center of gravity, targeting critical vulnerabilities, and using innovative techniques in support of a properly selected main effort (Warfighting MCDP-1, Chapter 4). All eight contributing authors identify incomplete knowledge of the enemy as the foundation beneath America's strategy in Vietnam. Five of the authors specifically refer to a passage in former Defense Secretary McNamara's book In Retrospect which blames our poor understanding of the Vietnamese situation to a "lack of experts." However, the divergence between McNamara's book and Prelude to Tragedy is that the latter is an autobiographical tribute by these very "experts" about their attempts to inform the American political and military establishment of the true nature of the conflict.. Having fought with Ho Chi Minh's forces in the conflict against the French, contributing authors Lu Lan and Tran Ngoc Chau understood that the center of gravity for both sides was the rural population. A population which provided concealment, intelligence, logistics, and manpower was the only fuel which could run the communist machine. To deny Ho Chi Minh popular political support would have driven him into an unwinnable conventional war. Therefore, the communists' critical vulnerability, their rear area, and their logistical infrastructure, so to speak, was the allegiance of the people. All eight authors of Prelude to Tragedy describe creative, unconventional methods that successfully attacked enemy vulnerabilities. These weaknesses were the communist incompatibilities with the social traditions of Vietnam and inability to bring about economic progress in the countryside. The great irony is that these methods were the least employed weapons within our arsenal. The last part of Prelude's thesis regards the South Vietnamese Army. The authors contend that it should have been trained as a decentralized, counter-guerilla force. In support of this main effort would have been a United States in an advisory or logistical role. However, the authors believe that early American withdrawal of political advisor Edward Lansdale, followed by Washington's tacit approval for President Diem's assassination made this relationship impossible to attain. The result was a large American military buildup which eventually bore the brunt of the fighting. Resulting Vietnamese disunity combined with the U.S. seizure of the limelight increased enemy influence in the countryside and irrevocably changed the future of Vietnam. Countless books have been written to explain the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Some say that more bombs would have won the war. Others regret American involvement altogether. The authors of Prelude to Tragedy do neither. They believe that their own effective methods could have, if supported on a large scale, greatly changed the outcome of the war. They contended then, as now, that a decentralized South Vietnamese government should have fought a largely political war using political means in the protection of the rural population. Tragic that this was the road less traveled. ... Read more

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This updated and expanded electronic book on CD-ROM has a comprehensive collection of thousands of spectacular, fully detailed color maps of important military campaigns from ancient times to the present. The public domain graphics are presented as JPG and GIF files suitable for use in any computer program. In addition, the maps are reproduced using Adobe Acrobat PDF software - allowing direct viewing of these impressive "Acrobat Atlases" on Windows and Apple Macintosh systems. In addition to the main collection of maps from the U.S. Military Academy, there are maps from the Army Center for Military History. In 1938 the USMA began developing campaign atlases to aid in teaching cadets a course entitled, "History of the Military Art." Since then, the Department has produced over six atlases and more than one thousand maps, encompassing not only America's wars but global conflicts as well. The maps were created by the United States Military Academy's Department of History and are the digital versions from the atlases printed by the United States Defense Printing Agency.Wars and conflicts included in this comprehensive collection of historic maps include: Art of Ancient Warfare (Classical Greece, The Greek Hoplite in Classical Warfare, Persian Empire, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Art of War, Hannibal Challenges the Roman Republic, Caesar and the Roman Empire, the Evolution of the Legion; the Byzantines and their Enemies, Barbarian Invasion Routes) * Dawn of Modern Warfare (The Beginning of Modern Warfare, Swiss Confederation, France during the Hundred Years War, Early Developments in Naval Warfare, Gustavus Adolphus and the Swedish Renaissance in Warfare, the Wars of Louis XIV, The Era of Frederick the Great) * Colonial Wars - French and Indian War Overview Map, The Thirteen Colonies, Colonial Expansion through 1758, Capture of Louisbourg, Battle of Monogahela, Operations in NY and Canada * The American Revolution - Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Chris ... Read more

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"The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to reconquer their country." These words from the 1945 Vietnamese Declaration of Independence told the world that the people of Vietnam would no longer tolerate foreign occupation of their nation. In the following Indochina War, Vietnamese fighters succeeded in ousting the French from their country after a surprise Vietnamese victory at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The two sides signed a peace treaty that year, but fighting was far from over in Vietnam. A new war began in 1957 between Communist forces, led by North Vietnam, and anti-Communist forces, including the powerful United States. The war finally ended eighteen years later, with a Communist victory and a death toll of one million people. Follow the dramatic story of bloody Dien Bien Phu and its aftermath: years of savage fighting in the jungles of Vietnam, antiwar protests and political turmoil in the United States, and ultimate reunification of Vietnam ... Read more

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This landmark work, based on Frances FitzGerald's own research and travels, takes us inside Vietnam-into the traditional, ancestor-worshiping villages and the corrupt crowded cities, into the conflicts between Communists and anti-Communists, Catholics and Buddhists, generals and monks -and reveals the country as seen through Vietnamese eyes. With a clarity and authority unrivaled by any book before it or since, Fire in the Lake shows how America utterly and tragically misinterpreted the realities of Vietnam. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (18)

Fire In The Lake
The condition of the book was as advertised and it arrived in the time frame as expected.

Dated, wrong, useless
"Fire in the Lake" is a hysterical book from a hysterical time. Whatever Frances Fitzgerald has to offer in terms of passion is overwhelmed in hindsight by appaulingly bad research, naive condecending attitudes and having gotten so many things so wrong about the war.

The book is incredibly derivative of the works of Paul Mus. Vietnam is seen through his eyes, his view of history and his biases. Fitzgerald, rather than doing research, simply parrots Mus.

She gets the NLF (Viet Cong) completely wrong. she treats all its wartime propaganda as unquestioned truth. Comparing what he said to the NLF postwar accounts, its clear that he was absolutely wrong. That doesn't make the pro-vietnam war side "right" or the vietnam war right. It just makes Frances Fitzgerald and her book wrong.

While this book is of use in understanding the psychology of the disputes in American society over the Vietnam War, it is worse than useless as any sort of account of events or history of the war. Almost any history written since 1979 or so is better than this dated nonsense.

A Work of Passion and Urgency
"Fire in the Lake" could have been written by Albert Camus or Hannah Arendt, but instead it was written by a 31-year old journalist Frances Fitzgerald, who in writing the book channeled all her society's fears and anger into passion and urgency to write this powerfully disturbing account of a young empire lost and corrupted.

The author analyzes the war through the viewpoints of its participants, and presents a sobering and poignant account of each player.There are the disciplined and organized North Vietnamese, who in knowing the righteousness of their cause have absolute faith in their victory.There are the hapless and hopeless South Vietnamese - the government, the military, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, and political opportunists -- who at first struggle against each other, and then struggle against the Americans before finally resigning themselves to the destruction of their society, culture, and history.But Ms. Fitzgerald focuses her most critical eye on the American empire - the government at home who will sacrifice 45,000 American soldiers to "save face," the military who internalize "Heart of Darkness" and decide that to save the Vietnamese they must first kill every one of them, and the diplomats who in trying to democratize Vietnam end up turning it into a corrupt tyranny that disgusts even the corrupt tyrants who ran it.In the end, Ms. Fitzgerald's verdict is stunning in its absoluteness and in its objectivity:America corrupted and destroyed Vietnam, and America corrupted and destroyed itself.

"Fire in the Lake" is above all prescient.The Pentagon Papers had not yet been released, and Frances Fitzgerald had already expressed to the American public why the war was being fought:not for liberty or to stop Communism or to save the Vietnamese, but simply because powerful men in omnipotent positions had petty egos.Even before the American withdrawal and even as the Tet offensive devastated and depleted the ranks of the Viet Cong, she could already declare that the war was over, and the North Vietnamese were triumphant.Even before there was a full accounting of the war, she could already indict the American military and government for genocide against the people they were ostensibly trying to save.During the book Ms. Fitzgerald would continuously allude to "The Tempest," and she could have just as easily allude to "King Lear":how one man's pride blinded him into unleashing a tragedy where good must die at the hands of evil.

It will be difficult for another work as powerful and passionate as "Fire in the Lake" to appear in the American landscape.Today, there is the War on Terror, and Jane Mayer in "The Dark Side" could indict the Bush administration for crimes greater than the Nixon administration in Vietnam - but it's clear from her nuanced and well-crafted arguments that they're just nuanced and well-crafted arguments.American society is not involved in the War on Terror the way it was involved during the Vietnam War.At that time, the young could sincerely and powerfully feel their future disappearing into a black void, and it was only natural and necessary for one of their own to channel this urgent and passionate fear and hopelessness into "Fire in the Lake."That no one can do that today - despite what's happen at Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan - does not speak well for the fate of America and of humanity.

The BEST book about the US in Vietnam
If you want to begin to understand the US involvement in Vietnam read this book, then read "The Best and The Brightest" and then read "A Bright Shining Lie".

Book made irrelevant and untrue by history
It is difficult to give this book a critical look because it has become as unquestioned as the Bible is in certain circles.According to the author the Vietnamese are unknown and unknowable to westerners. (Somehow she has grasped their elemental essence.) They share so little in common with the rest of humanity that Stalinist communism is the only political system under which they will prosper and be true to their anthropological roots."The moment has arrived for the narrow flame of revolution to cleanse the lake of Vietnamese society from the corruption and disorder of the American war.It will have to come, for it is the only way the Vietnamese of the south can restore their country and their history to themselves."As it has been seen by the eyes of the world through the history of Southeast Asia since 1975 the South Vietnamese were truly fortunate to have been "liberated" and "brought back to their heritage" by a force as truly benevolent and peaceful as the government of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

Overly academic in an elitist anti-anticommunist way, this book has been required reading in all "revisionist" undergraduate history seminars and lectures since its first publication in 1972. (What was "revisionist" in the 1970s is the Very Truth in 2005.) It has the obligitory academic but irrelevant references to "dead white men" (Shakespeare's Tempest) for mostly incomprehensible reasons.

As I watch the people of Vietnam being pimped by their government to enrich its coffers and those of the Nike Corporation, I think of how stupid, ignorant and ultimately vile this book is and was.As I watch the diaspora of Vietnam succeed and prosper I wonder how Frances Fitzgerald can sleep for all of their brothers and sisters left behind in that unfortunate and misjudged land. For all of its damage done it is regrettable that this book was not the end of Frances Fitzgerald's career, but its beginning. ... Read more

Product Description

This book provides full details of contemporary economic and political developments in Vietnam.  It continues the overview of developments up to late 2005 which were covered in the author’s Vietnam: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments (also published by Routledge, 2006).  Key topics covered include Vietnam's success, in general, in maintaining high rates of growth in the face of problems such as inflation and the global financial crisis; continuing economic reforms; foreign trade and investment; battles against corruption; population growth; the determination of the Communist Party to maintain its hold on power; and Vietnam's response to public health problems such as AIDS, SARS and bird flu.

Customer Reviews (2)

A conspiracy way bigger than the KKK and neo-Nazis
I read this book a number of years ago, and it sheds a lot of light on a lot of things, including the assassinations of JFK, his brother RFK, MLK, and the demise of numerous other progressive figures, people who died trying to make a difference. Not only does the author James Dickerson indicts the KKK and neo-Nazis in that era, but also reactionary forces like the White Citizens' Council, the Mississippi State Sovereignty Committee, and certain right-wing elements in the federal government (J. Edgar Hoover's FBI and the CIA), organized crime, and big business, who all were involved in a massive criminal conspiracy to thwart the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam Antiwar movement. This was way bigger than a ring of local redneck thugs wearing bedsheets and brown shirts with swastika arm bands, who wanted to maintain social order through violence. They were too hateful and ignorant to understand that J. Edgar Hoover had similar views and was sympathetic to their cause despite the fact he was spying on them as well (anything he believed that was un-American, both left and right). The government at that time was also spreading misinformation and conducting a campaign of blackmail that led to the downfall and undoing of some people who were involved in the civil rights struggle. It also suggests that the assassination of JFK was a mob hit and that Lee Harvey Oswald was made a scapegoat by the government; his brother RFK was waging a war against organized crime and some felt that due to their father's sometime involvement with the Mob in the past may have led to this. Dixie's Dirty Secret also shows that some of history's famous figures in the White House and Supreme Court may have had dealings with unsavory people who were their benefactors politically. My, isn't history a cesspool?

Ambititious but inconclusive.
Dickerson, who is something of an expert on the area, looks at the Delta's dark underside in this highly readable and admirably researched investigative report.
He labors to weave together rednecks, the Mafia,wealthy Memphis businessmen, politicians, and cops into a coherent web ofconspiracy against Civil Rights and war protest, but his results tend to besuggestive rather than conclusive.
He does seem to have read everythingever written on the region, and in the face of such impressive effort itseems almost ungrateful to point out that the Little Rock Central HighSchool crisis took place in 1957, not 1954, and the Vietnam War did not endwith the American withdrawal in 1973, but such lapses will serve as usefulreminders that sweeping exposes must be received with a degree of caution. ... Read more

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In a system that is known for its covert political style, Vietnam’s decision making process is often described as either consensus-based or simply confusing and inexplicable. This book provides an approach to understanding political decision making in Vietnam by recognizing enduring values that are derived from State-controlled education and official historical narratives.

The nation’s official historical narrative has led to the development of protected values that are called upon during political decision making. In order to secure these values, such as regime stability, national independence, and social order, officials must act within accepted rules of appropriate political behavior. The book shows that through State-run education, mandatory defense training, and membership in mass organizations, Vietnamese citizens are taught social and political ethics, and their identity is moulded in concert with this process.

Using textbooks and education to understand the underlying values within Vietnam’s society is used as the contextual framework for two case studies - the problem of landmines and the on-going threat of avian influenza - which examine how authorities frame problems, negotiate, and deal with potential crises.

This book will be of great interest of academics and students within Asian studies, but also for policy makers involved with the country and those doing business in Vietnam, including non-governmental organizations, private businesses and charitable groups.

Customer Reviews (1)

Right on the money
I was the Marine and Naval Attache in Vietnam for three years and had a first-hand chance to witness in action what Dr. Lucius has written about it her book.The author is right on the money.

Not much contemporary research of value exists today to help explain why Vietnam's leaders act as they do and how they perceive their national interests, but this book goes a long way towards filling an enormous gap in the literature. The background material, especially that dealing with the education system and its fostering of enduring cultural values that shape mental models of what it means to be Vietnamese are critical for understanding Vietnamese political thinking. This is the kind of stuff McNamara was pining for when he said that we simply did not understand the Vietnamese. Dr. Lucius' work has been a long time coming and will be invaluable to anybody who wants to know why they act as they do and not as we think they should. ... Read more

Product Description
This fourth volume of a five-part policy history of the U.S. government and the Vietnam War covers the core period of U.S. involvement, from July 1965, when the decision was made to send large-scale U.S. forces, to the beginning of 1968, just before the Tet offensive and the decision to seek a negotiated settlement. Using a wide variety of archival sources and interviews, the book examines in detail the decisions of the president, relations between the president and Congress, and the growth of public and congressional opposition to the war. Differences between U.S. military leaders on how the war should be fought are also included, as well as military planning and operations.

Among many other important subjects, the financial effects of the war and of raising taxes are considered, as well as the impact of a tax increase on congressional and public support for the war. Another major interest is the effort by Congress to influence the conduct of the war and to place various controls on U.S. goals and operations. The emphasis throughout this richly textured narrative is on providing a better understanding of the choices facing the United States and the way in which U.S. policymakers tried to find an effective politico-military strategy, while also probing for a diplomatic settlement. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

"No, Mr. President, you're not winning the war."
From this book:

Congressman Tim Lee Carter (R-KY), 1966:

"No, Mr. President, you are not winning the war."

On August 28, 1967, Carter stated

"Let us now, while we are yet strong, bring our men home, every man jack of them. The Vietcong fight fiercely and tenaciously because it is their land and we are foreigners intervening in their civil war.If we must fight, let us fight in defense of our homeland and our own hemisphere."

Colleague of Senator Sherman Cooper (R-KY), who later drafted the Cooper-Church amendment to end that mess.

Pearls like those above make this author's work extremely valuable.

The Best Available Serious Vietnam War Study
This is the fourth and largest volume of a mammoth five-volume study (volume five is not yet complete). This review applies to both this volume and to the study in general.

The Gibbons Study is the largest, mostbalanced, and most complete study of US Government Vietnam policy currentlyavailable. Its goal is much like that of the Pentagon Papers, and in sizeit is just as big as the analysis section of that study. However, it ismuch more comprehensive, using resources (like the LBJ library) which wereunavailable in the late 60s. It is all original analysis, and contains onlya few pieces of contemporary primary documents (unlike the Pentagon Papers,which contains a million words of documents).

The study was commissionedby the Senate Foreign Relations committee in the late 1970s, and the workwas done by Gibbons, a researcher in the Congressional Research Service ofthe Library of Congress. True to his mission, Gibbons keeps his work asapolitical as possible.

Every page is very detailed andimpeccably-referenced. The references themselves are worthy of note, asthey use the rarely-used form of footnotes, as opposed to endnotes. Such aformat puts the references right on the page with the main text, so it isfar easier for the reader to make use of them. And, in the Gibbons study,the footnotes are often huge and detailed.

This work is frequently citedas a principal reference by many recent Vietnam writers, including Karnow,Hendrickson, Gardner, and Herring, exceeded in such references only byForeigh Relations of the United States. It is a big, serious study,appropriate for only the most dedicated student of the war.

This volumeis by far the largest in the series, amounting to approximately 645,000words. In comparison, Stanley Karnow's great general history,"Vietnam: A History," is considered a large book, yet it measures330,000 words. But don't be intimidated -- the size and detail of Gibbons'work only adds to its usefulness. ... Read more

Product Description
Books like this one should help sober all who read it. Finally, one-man, one-vote becomes One Man. Yet no Dictator is as dangerous as the undisciplined desires of the people. Dictators are far more easily done away with. Of all forms of government, a Republic is the least reprehensible; and a tyrannical democracy is the most unbearable. A government which allowsthe "have-not" majority to confiscate the "excess" earnings and assets of the "have" minority is a governmental tyranny regardless of whether it has free elections or not. For no dictatorship is more corrupt or tyrannical than the dictatorship of the mob. - Tom Anderson ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from WWP-Report on Engineering Construct & Plant Operations in the Developing World, published by Worldwide Projects, Inc. on September 1, 2002. The length of the article is 1193 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: VIETNAM: Government approval regarding the proposed construction of a new 250,000 ton per year steel mill is tentatively expected by the end of the year 2002 and be followed by an invitation to bid on equipment supply, VIETNAM STEEL CORP. (VSC) [Vietnam] - Order #: 091202.
Publication: WWP-Report on Engineering Construct & Plant Operations in the Developing World (Newsletter)
Date: September 1, 2002
Publisher: Worldwide Projects, Inc.
Volume: 11Issue: 09

Distributed by Thomson Gale ... Read more

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This volume is produced from digital images created through the University of Michigan University Library's large-scale digitization efforts. The Library seeks to preserve the intellectual content of items in a manner that facilitates and promotes a variety of uses. The digital reformatting process results in an electronic version of the original text that can be both accessed online and used to create new print copies. The Library also understands and values the usefulness of print and makes reprints available to the public whenever possible. This book and hundreds of thousands of others can be found in the HathiTrust, an archive of the digitized collections of many great research libraries. For access to the University of Michigan Library's digital collections, please see http://www.lib.umich.edu and for information about the HathiTrust, please visit http://www.hathitrust.org ... Read more